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GIVING COMPETENCY
ITS DAY IN COURT
In re Fellman'
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of arbitration as a forum for dispute resolution has encountered
widespread acceptance and approval; it is generally embraced as an effective and
efficient mechanism for resolving disputes.2 However, there also exists an
awareness that arbitration is unsatisfactory for resolving certain classes of
disputes.' These disputes generally require broad procedural safeguards and
involve issues of public policy.
This Note will examine the decision in In re Fellman,4 where the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania determined that the issue of competency was a matter for
the courts, not arbitration, to determine.5 Furthermore, this Note will explain
how Fellman is consistent with cases concerning different issues, but which
similarly denied arbitrators authority based upon similar reasoning.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The situation giving rise to the case at hand was the refusal of a potential
beneficiary of a revocable trust to assist the settlors, Mr. and Mrs. Fellman, in
terminating the trust. 6 Harold and Marie Fellman, husband and wife, created a
revocable trust, transferring their assets to co-trustees, consisting of themselves
and their nephew, Sidney J. Fellman. The trust was created for the benefit of
the settlors, Mr. and Mrs. Fellman, during their lifetime.8 Paragraph 7 of the
trust agreement provided that following the death of Mr. and Mrs. Fellman, "the
entire remaining trust fund after payment of [certain] special bequests set forth
above in this § 7 shall be held and administered for the benefit of the Grantor's
1. 604 A.2d 263 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
2. See Weinrott v. Carp, 298 N.E.2d 42, 47-48 (N.Y. 1973).
3. Stewart E. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public
Policy Defense, 1981 CARDOzo L. REV. 481, 482.
4. 604 A.2d 263.
5. Id. at 267.
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nephew, SIDNEY J. FELLMAN." 9 The trust agreement also contained a clause
explicitly reserving the right of Mr. and Mrs. Fellman to revoke the trust.'m
On July 18, 1990, Harold and Marie Fellman decided to revoke the trust and
desired to withdraw all assets belonging to the trust." They requested that
Sidney J. Fellman join with them to "execute and deliver to the undersigned as
grantors any and all instruments required to transfer to the grantors all of the
assets of the trust." 2 Sidney refused to comply with this request. 3
Following their nephew's refusal, Mr. and Mrs. Fellman sought relief from
the Orphans' Court, which issued a citation to Sidney directing him to show cause
why he should not assist in helping to revoke the trust.' 4 Sidney answered the
citation by averring that the Fellmans were physically and/or mentally impaired
and moved for physical and mental examinations of the Fellmans. 5 Sidney J.
Fellman thus challenged Mr. and Mrs. Fellman's rights to revoke the trust based
on their competency at the time of the attempted revocation.' 6
The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Orphans' Division,
denied the relief sought by the Fellmans and directed the parties to submit to
arbitration the question of the settlors' competency.'" The Orphans' Court held
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case based on an arbitration clause in the
trust agreement which required a dispute concerning the competency of a
beneficiary or trustee to be arbitrated."
9. Id.
10. Id. That clause read:
§ 1. Rights of the Grantor During his Lifetime.
The Grantor shall have the following rights while he is alive:
(a) The Grantor reserves the right at any time or times during his lifetime by written
notice to the Trustee to:
(i) revoke all or any part of this agreement;
(ii) withdraw all or any part of the assets belonging to the trust estate;
(iii) alter or amend any term or provision of this Agreement, except the
Grantor shall have no right or power to change the duties or immunities of
the Trustee without the Trustee's written consent.
A complete revocation of this Agreement shall vest in the Grantor all assets then
possessed by the Trustee. Upon the Grantor's request, the Trustee shall execute and
deliver to the Grantor any and all instruments required to transfer to the Grantor any trust








17. Id. at 263-64.
18. Id. at 264. That clause read:
§ 29. Arbitration.
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this trust Agreement, or the breach
thereof, shall be to the extent permitted by law settled by arbitration in the city of Miami,
Florida, in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the American Arbitration
[Vol. 1993, No. 1
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After being denied relief by the Orphans' Court, the Fellmans appealed to
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, contending that: (1) they reserved the right
to revoke the trust, and Sidney, a co-trustee, could not prevent them from
exercising the power so reserved; and (2) their competency was not an arbitrable
issue. 19
On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that, as a matter of
public policy, issues of incompetency cannot be submitted to arbitration and
further that the arbitration clause in the Fellman Trust Agreement was ineffective
so as to deprive the Orphans' Court jurisdiction to hear and decide the issue of
the settlors' alleged incompetency to revoke the trust.2"
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Due to a lack of case law regarding the issue of an arbitrator's authority to
determine mental competency, the Fellman court chose to examine cases dealing
with arbitrators' authority in different contexts. 2' Courts have addressed the
issues of arbitrability in areas including civil rights disputes,22 child custody,23
education,24 civil service appointments,' and punitive damage awards.26  In
each of these contexts, various courts have denied the authority of an arbitrator
to rule based on either constitutional27 or public policy concerns.28
The United States Supreme Court has denied the authority of arbitrators to
determine issues that require substantial procedural protections guaranteed by the
Association, and judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in any court having
jurisdiction thereof.
The above § 7 and § 28 require that a dispute concerning the competency of a
beneficiary or trustee be arbitrated. The Grantor recognizes that the issue of the
competency of the Grantor, his spouse, his children and other descendants, all of whom
are potential beneficiaries and trustees hereunder, involves not only the financial affairs
of the Trust but the family relationships among Grantor, his spouse, his children and
other descendants and it is his intention whenever possible to avoid litigation on the issue
of competency and to resolve that issue entirely through the process of arbitration.
Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 267.
21. See id. at 266-67 (discussing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Garrity
v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976)).
22. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56-58.
23. See Agur v. Agur, 298 N.Y.S.2d 772, 777 (App. Div. 1969).
24. See Three Village Teachers' Ass'n v. Three Village Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 N.Y.S.2d 644,
646-47 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
25. See City of Salamanca v. City of Salamanca Police Unit, 497 N.Y.S.2d 856, 859 (Sup. Ct.
1986).
26. See Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 795-96.
27. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57-60.
28. See Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 795-96; Agur, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 777; City of Salamanca, 497
N.Y.S.2d at 859; Three Village, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 646-47.
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Due Process Clause of the Constitution.29 In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co.,3" the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of arbitrability of a claim under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act."1 In Alexander, the Court determined that an
employee had a statutory right to trial de novo under Title VII, despite a prior
adverse ruling made by an arbitrator pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement.32 The Court's argument against arbitrability was supported by its
finding that federal courts have plenary powers to enforce Title VII
requirements.33 The Court noted that the purpose and procedures of Title VII
indicate that Congress intended federal courts to exercise final responsibility for
enforcement of Title VII 4 Therefore, the Court held that deferral to arbitral
decisions would be inconsistent with that goal.'
The Alexander Court further stressed the constitutional safeguards required
in civil rights cases.' In an arbitration proceeding, the rights protected by
constitutional notions of due process are not guaranteed.37 The Court noted that
the fact finding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial fact
finding, 3 the record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete, 39 and the
usual rules of evidence in a judicial setting do not apply.' Furthermore, the
Court found that in an arbitration proceeding, the rights and procedures common
to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and
testimony under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable. 4 The Supreme
Court determined that the informality of the arbitral proceedings, which enables
them to function as efficient, inexpensive, and expedient means of dispute
resolution, also makes arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution of
Title VII issues than the federal courts.42
In a similar vein, New York state courts have refused to honor arbitration
clauses in a variety of contexts based on public policy concerns. 3 In each
29. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56.
30. 415 U.S. 36.
31. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 55-60; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1988).
32. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44-60. The Court further stated that arbitral decisions may be
admitted as evidence and accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate. Id. at 60.
33. Id. at 47.
34. Id. at 56.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 56-58.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 57.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 57-58.
42. Id. at 58.
43. See Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 794; Agur, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 777; City of Salamanca, 497
N.Y.S.2d at 859; Three Village, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
[Vol. 1993, No. I
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situation, the court vacated an arbitral ruling based on a consideration that the
ruling was counter to some provision of the state's public policy."
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court dealt with the issue
of arbitration of child custody matters in Agur v. Agur." In Agur, a marital
separation agreement provided that any controversy arising between the parties
would be arbitrated under Jewish religious law." Respondent claimed that the
matter of custody of the couple's child was subject to this arbitration clause.47
The Agur court based its authority in disallowing arbitration of child custody
matters on the state's policy of acting as parens patriae to do what was best for
the interests of the child." The court noted that the very nature of a child
custody decision calls for determination by a court as opposed to arbitration.4 9
The Agur decision noted that, unlike a family court judge, there is no assurance
of the qualifications of an arbitrator and no necessity that the parties nominate
persons whose backgrounds or competence would certify a proper decision.'0
Further, the court stated that where arbitration stresses the end of a dispute by
declaring custody to one of the parties, the reviewing court is not bound to grant
custody to either parent but may decide that, in the child's best interests, neither
should have custody.5" The court noted that agreements by parents as to custody
of their children are never final, but subject always to the supervening power of
the court. 52 Thus, as a matter of public policy, the Agur court determined that
the limited function of arbitration, as stipulated by the parties, would not serve
the court in discharging its duties as parens patriae.5 3
The Court of Appeals of New York addressed the issue of an arbitrator's
power to award punitive damages in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. * In Garrity,
the court vacated an arbitrator's award of punitive damages55 and held that an
44. See Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 794; Agur, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 777; City of Salamanca, 497
N.Y.S.2d at 859; Three Village, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
45. 298 N.Y.S.2d 772; see Sterk, supra note 3, at 501-02 (discussing Agur).
46. Agur, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 774.
47. Id. at 775. The court agreed that the arbitration clause takes into account the dispute of
custody, as the clause included as a subject for deliberation "any controversy . . . over the ...
application of any part" of the agreement. Id. at 776.
48. Id. "Parens patriae" refers to the role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under
legal disabilities, such as juveniles or the insane, and in child custody determinations, when acting on
behalf of the state to protect the interests of the child. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed.
1990).
49. Agur, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 777. The court did agree that arbitration was useful when the
mundane matter of the amount of support is the issue. Id. However, it is less so when the delicate
balancing of the factors composing the best interests of the child is the matter at hand. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 776.
53. Id. at 779.
54. 353 N.E.2d 794; see also Sterk, supra note 3, at 527-33 (discussing Garrity).
55. Garrty, 353 N.E.2d at 794.
1993]
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arbitrator has no power to award punitive damages, even if it has been agreed to
by the parties.56
The Garrity court based its conclusion on public policy grounds, stating that
the award of "[p]unitive damages is a sanction reserved to the State, a public
policy of such magnitude as to call for judicial intrusion to prevent its
contravention."57 The court noted that punitive damages are enforced not only
to punish the individual defendant but to deter the defendant, as well as others,
from indulging in similar conduct in the future.5 8 It is a social "remedy," not
a private compensatory remedy.5 9
The court stated that "[t]he evil of permitting an arbitrator whose selection
is often restricted or manipulat[ed] by the party in the superior bargaining
position, to award punitive damages is that it displaces the court and the jury, and
therefore the State, as the engine for imposing a social sanction. "I Since
enforcement of an award of punitive damages as a purely private remedy would
violate strong public policy, the court held that an arbitrator's award which
imposes punitive damages should be vacated. 6
The New York Supreme Court next addressed an arbitrator's authority to
determine a teacher's employment status in Three Village Teachers' Ass'n v.
Three Village Central School District.' In this case, pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement, the parties agreed to submit to arbitration controversies
between the teachers' association and the school district and to accept the
arbitrator's judgment as binding.' The teachers' union requested arbitration
when the school district awarded a class assignment to a less-tenured teacher. 6'
The arbitrator determined that the most important consideration for the district in
making appointments was an ability to provide continuity of the learning
experience.' Despite this fact, the arbitrator held that desiring continuity was
not a bona fide educational reason for the district to hire as it did. 6 The school
district sought to vacate the arbitrator's ruling on the grounds that it contravened
public policy.67
The Three Village court held that an arbitrator dealing with issues concerning
school district responsibility to maintain adequate standards in the classroom may
not infringe on substantive issues without violating public policy." The court
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 795.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 796.
61. Id. at 794.
62. 494 N.Y.S.2d 644.
63. Id. at 645.
64. Id. at 646.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 645.
68. Id. at 647.
[Vol. 1993, No. 1
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found that the arbitrator in this case "based her decision on substantive grounds
not procedural grounds in holding that the Board lacked a compelling reason" to
offer employment.' Since the award of the arbitrator contravenes public policy,
and because continuity of education is a substantive issue, the court determined
that the decision had to be vacated. 0
Finally, the issue of making civil service appointments was declared
inarbitrable based on public policy concerns in City of Salamanca v. City of
Salamanca Police Unit.7 In City of Salamanca, a police officer pursued
arbitration after being terminated for lying about his eyesight on a civil service
application.' The court referred to a number of statutory enactments concerning
appointment of state civil service workers. 3 The court then noted that there is
a strong public policy regarding civil service appointments and that such policy
is born out of important constitutional and statutory enactments which impose
heavy responsibilities on state courts.74 The court noted that such strong public
policy in the area of appointment to the state civil service imposes a proper
restriction on the freedom to arbitrate.7'
In addition, the City of Salamanca court referred to a previously developed
test which determined when judicial intervention into arbitration proceedings
under public policy considerations is appropriate.76 According to this test, the
judicial system should intervene and set aside an arbitration proceeding "only
when the [arbitral] award contravenes a strong public policy, almost invariably
involving an important constitutional or statutory duty or responsibility. "77
Previously, courts have either vacated or refused to grant an arbitrator
authority in certain delicate contexts. In the instant case, the court was
confronted with the issue of an arbitrator's authority to determine mental
competence, an issue involving both constitutional and public policy concerns.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Fellman, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania faced the question of
whether determining competency is an arbitrable issue. The court first noted that
the Fellmans had made a valid revocation of their trust.7' Pennsylvania law
allows a settlor to revoke or amend a revocable trust in accordance with the terms
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 497 N.Y.S.2d 856.
72. Id. at 857.
73. Id. at 858.
74. Id. at 859.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 858 (citing In re Port Jefferson Station Teachers Ass'n v. Brookhaven-Comsewogue
Union Free Sch. Dist., 383 N.E.2d 553 (N.Y. 1978)).
77. Port Jefferson, 383 N.E.2d at 554.
78. Fellman, 604 A.2d at 265.
19931
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of the trust.' Further, the court cited the Restatement (Second) of Trusts
Section 330(a), which states that "[tihe settlor has power to revoke the trust if and
to the extent that by the terms of the trust he reserved such a power."' The
court found that the trust agreement contained a clear and unconditional
revocation clause"1 and that the Fellmans gave the necessary notice and followed
the required procedures effectively to revoke the trust. 2
The court next addressed the issue of competency to revoke a trust.' The
court stated the general rule that an absolute right to revoke a revocable trust is
subject to the limitation that the settlor must be competent at the time of acting
to revoke the trust.' Thus, "although the settlor has reserved a power of
revocation, he cannot revoke the trust if he lacks mental competence at the time
when he attempts to revoke it. "' The court noted the uniformity of this notion
in other court decisions.'
The court noted that the issues determined by a competency hearing directly
affect individual liberty interests, and, therefore, the individual must be
guaranteed substantial procedural protections.' In Pennsylvania, these
procedural guarantees have been codified in a statute." Recognizing the
individual rights at issue in an incompetency proceeding, the Pennsylvania
legislature adopted a statutory framework which serves to protect an individual
who may be incompetent.8 9 One such provision establishes the following
procedural safeguards: (a) notice to the alleged incompetent; (b) a hearing at
which good cause for a finding of incompetency must be shown; (c) a hearing
with a jury if requested by the alleged incompetent; and (d) the presence of the
alleged incompetent at the hearing in the absence of exceptional circumstances.'
The court noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had earlier recognized the
importance of statutory incompetency proceedings: 91 "[M]ental capacity and
competency are to be presumed and before any person shall be deprived of the
right to manage his own affairs, there must be clear and convincing proof of
mental incompetency and such proof must be preponderating."'
79. See In re Insurance Trust Agreement of Kaufmann, 331 A.2d 209, 211 (Pa. 1975).
80. Feilman, 604 A.2d at 265 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330(a) (1987)).
81. Id. The clause in question was Section 1 of the Fellman Trust Agreement. See supra note
10 (quoting the clause).
82. Feilman, 604 A.2d at 265.
83. See id.
84. Id.; see Florida Nat'l Bank v. Genova, 460 So. 2d 895, 898 (Fla. 1984).
85. Feilman, 604 A.2d at 265 (citing AUSTIN W. SCoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 330 (1989)).
86. Id.; see First Nat'l Bank v. Oppenheimer, 190 N.E.2d 70, 75 (Ohio 1963); Kemmerer v.
Kemmerer, 139 N.E.2d 84, 86 (Ohio 1956).
87. Feilman, 604 A.2d at 265.
88. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5501 (1975).
89. See Felman, 604 A.2d at 265.
90. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511 (1975).
91. Feffman, 604 A.2d at 266; see In re Myers Estate, 150 A.2d 525, 526 (Pa. 1959).
92. Myers, 150 A.2d at 526 (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 1993, No. I
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The Fellman court observed that many of the rights guaranteed by the
Pennsylvania incompetency statute included the essential procedural safeguards
afforded by the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 93 The court then referred to the differences between the
procedure of an arbitration proceeding versus a civil trial.' The court stressed
that in an arbitration proceeding, rights protected by constitutional notions of due
process or rights afforded by a statute are not guaranteed.,, Often, in an arbitral
proceeding, "rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery,
compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are often
severely limited or unavailable. "'
Because of this lack of guaranteed constitutional safeguards, the Fellman
court found that "arbitration is not an appropriate vehicle for determining the
incompetency of an individual. " In supporting this position, the court cited the
Alexander Court's concern regarding the lack of procedural safeguards in
arbitrating civil rights disputes under Title VII. 98 Generally, the Fellman court
continued, as the issues involved in a case increase in importance, they require
more procedural protections and are thereby afforded more due process. 9 Both
Feliman and Alexander involved individuals whose liberty interests were
threatened; both represent cases of such importance so as to command the highest
due process protections.
The court next found support for its position by referring to a number of
New York decisions which refused to honor arbitration clauses. 00 In each
case, the matter involved was ruled inarbitrable based on state public policy
reasons.' 0' After citing these cases, the Fellman court held that, as a matter of
93. Fellman, 604 A.2d at 266. These rights included "notice and an opportunity to be heard and
to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case before a tribunal having
jurisdiction of the cause." Parker v. Children's Hosp., 394 A.2d 932, 945 (Pa. 1978).
94. See Feilman, 604 A.2d at 266.
95. Id.
96. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57-58,
97. Fellman, 604 A.2d at 266.
98. Id. at 266-67; see also Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56-58.
99. See Fellman, 604 A.2d at 266; see also, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35
(1976).
100. Fellman, 604 A.2d at 267 (citing Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 794; In re Aimcee Wholesale
Corp., 237 N.E.2d 223, 224 (N.Y. 1968); Durst v. Abrash, 213 N.E.2d 887, 888 (N.Y. 1965); In
re Knickerbocker Agency, 149 N.E.2d 885, 887 (N.Y. 1958); Erdhein v. Selkowe, 380 N.Y.S.2d
20, 21 (App. Div. 1976)).
101. See Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 794 (arbitrator's award of punitive damages as purely private
remedy vacated as violative of public policy); Aimcee Wholesale Corp., 237 N.E.2d at 224
(enforcement of the state's antitrust policy cannot be left to commercial arbitration); Durst, 213
N.E.2d at 888 (enforcement of usurious loan agreement); Knickerbocker Agency, 149 N.E.2d at 887
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Pennsylvania public policy, issues of incompetency could not be submitted to
arbitration. "
The court concluded its opinion by stating that only the judicial system is
equipped to handle incompetency hearings"°3 and the legal ramifications
following a determination of incompetency."°4 Thus, in the interests of public
policy and of assuring constitutional and statutory safeguards, the court held that
issues of incompetency in Pennsylvania could not be submitted to arbitration.,o5
As a result, the Fellman court held that the arbitration clause in the trust
agreement at hand was ineffective and the Orphans' Court had jurisdiction to
decide the issue of incompetency to revoke the trust. °0
V. COMMENT
The holding in In re Fellman is very much in line with current case law,
which has denied the authority of an arbitrator in a variety of contexts.°7 The
Fellman court achieved its goal of denying arbitration by relying primarily on
New York case law."lo It is the position of Justice Johnson in his dissent that
the majority's examination of New York case law on a variety of matters not
involving competency, as well as the majority's citing of a United States Supreme
Court case for the principle that the resolution of statutory and constitutional
issues is a primary responsibility of the courts, is of little help in determining
"whether, under Florida law, arbitration of the issue brought under the Fellman
Trust can be accomplished. "1 9 For whatever reasons the court relied on New
York case law, the significance of the cases thus relied upon is their discussion
of public policy concerns not, as the dissent would believe, their jurisdiction.
A major portion of the Fellman holding was based on the deficiencies in
procedural safeguards offered by arbitration." 0 For support of this finding,
102. Fellman, 604 A.2d at 267.
103. Id. The dissent argued that the trial court found no authority on the question whether an
arbitrator may determine issues of competency. Id. at 269 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Judge Johnson,
the lone dissenter, stated:
The majority examines New York law on a variety of matters not involving competency,
and cites to the United States Supreme Court for the principle that the resolution of
statutory and constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of the courts. I find none
of this helpful in determining whether, under Florida law, arbitration of the issue brought
under the Fellman trust can be accomplished.
Id.
104. Id. at 267.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text. See generally Sterk, supra note 3, at 481-
543.
108. See Fellman, 604 A.2d at 267.
109. Id. at 269 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 266-67.
[Vol. 1993, No. I
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Fellman relied principally on Alexander."' The Alexander Court concluded:
(1) that the fact finding process in arbitration was normally inferior to that of the
courts; and (2) that common civil trial rights and procedures, such as discovery,
cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are often severely limited or
unavailable in arbitral proceedings."' Due to these procedural deficiencies, as
well as the delicate nature of a discrimination claim, the Alexander Court held
that it was Congress's intent for Title VII claims to be heard by the courts, not
in arbitration.13
The issue in Fellman is comparable to the issue involved in Alexander. The
person judged incompetent and the person being discriminated against are both
subjected to a societal position inferior to those around them. Because of this, an
alleged incompetent should be afforded every procedural safeguard available to
assure the accuracy of the finding. Acknowledging this very point, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: "A finding of mental incompetency is not
to be sustained simply if there is any evidence of such incompetency, but only
where the evidence is preponderating and points unerringly to mental
incompetency. "114
Courts have historically been involved with issues of judging competency.
A constitutional right to a hearing on competence is triggered when a bona fide
doubt arises as to a defendant's competence."' Trial courts also have been
given increased responsibilities for monitoring the competence of defendants. "
6
Finally, states must provide sufficient procedural protection for the competency
proceeding. 1 ' The Alexander Court determined that arbitrators did not provide
sufficient procedural safeguards to entrust Title VII claims to them." 8 The
Fellman court was correct in reaching the same conclusion in regards to
competency hearings.
Another justification for denying the authority of arbitrators in a
competency proceeding is based on public policy concerns. Courts have
recognized that in certain contexts, public policy strongly urges the use of the
courts." 9 The City of Salamanca court stated that "[p]ublic policy, whether
derived from, and whether explicit or implicit in statute or decisional law, or in
neither, may restrict the freedom to arbitrate. '"2 The Fellman court determined
that allowing an arbitrator to determine competency would be contrary to the
state's public policy. 21
111. See id.
112. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57-58.
113. Id. at 58; see supra notes 29-42 (discussing Alexander).
114. See Myers, 150 A.2d at 527 (emphasis in original).
115. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966).
116. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 177 (1975).
117. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 378.
118. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58.
119. Sterk, supra note 3, at 482.
120. City of Salamanca, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
121. See Fellman, 604 A.2d at 267.
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There are several reasons why allowing competency to be determined by
arbitration would violate public policy. The court in Agur, in denying arbitration
of a child custody matter, determined that the state acts as parens patriae in such
a matter. 12 Under the theory of parens patriae, the state acts as sovereign and
guardian of juveniles, as well as the insane." Thus, it is the state's
responsibility to protect the interests of those persons either judged or alleged to
be incompetent. The responsibility should include providing a full judicial inquiry
with full procedural safeguards in determining competency. Allowing arbitration
of this matter would minimize the state's effectiveness in its role of parens
patriae.
City of Salamanca noted that public policy is born out of important
constitutional and statutory enactments which impose heavy responsibilities on the
courts. 11 In Pennsylvania, the legislature has enacted a statute which served
to protect an individual alleged to be incompetent. " The statute includes
provisions for an incompetency hearing and a jury where requested. 2 6 Where
a statute exists, public policy is best served by adhering to the intent of the
lawmakers. Because the efficient nature of an arbitrator may result in adhering
to less of the procedural protections offered by the statute, public policy is served
best by denying authority.
VI. CONCLUSION
In essence, In re Fellman determined that, based on the individual liberties
at stake in a competency hearing, the issue of judging competency was too
important to be determined by an arbitrator. Claims such as child custody,
employment discrimination, and competency determination all involve issues of
individual liberties for the parties involved. While the court's use of New York
case law to support Fellan may be questionable, justice was served by assuring
that findings of competency will be protected by the courts.
MICHAEL C. KIRKHAM
122. See Agur, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
123. See supra note 48.
124. See City of Salananca, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
125. See Feilman, 604 A.2d at 265; see also 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5501 (1975).
126. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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